CASE NOTES by unknown
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 8 Issue 4 Article 4 
Summer 1956 
CASE NOTES 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Case Notes, 8 S.C.L.R. 457. (1956). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Eminent Domain - Redevelop-
ment Plan with Sale to Private Enterprise. - Plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment to enjoin the defendants from acquiring prop-
erty under a redevelopment project and to declare unconstitutional
the "Redevelopment Law", §§ 36-401 e't seq. of the Code of Laws
of South Carolina 1952. The Housing Authority of the City of
Columbia had declared plaintiffs' property to be a blighted area
which was principally occupied by slum dwellings. If necessary
the property was to be taken by condemnation. Under the proposed
plan the land would be cleared of its present structures and then
sold, a portion going to the University of South Carolina, and the
remainder to private individuals for light industrial sites. Plaintiffs
contended that the taking of their property was not a taking for
public use. The master and trial court upheld the law and project,
with judgment being entered for the Housing Authority. On ap-
peal, HELD: Reversed, except insofar as it affects the land which
was conveyed to the University of South Carolina. According to
Art. 1, Sec. 17 of the South Carolina Constitution, private proper-
ty shall not be taken for private use without the consent of the
owner, nor for public use without just compensation being first
made therefor. Here the court found that there was not a public
use, without which the private property could not be taken. Edens
v. City of Columbia, 91 S.E. 2d 280 (S.C. 1956).
It is a universally, established rule that private property cannot
be constitutionally taken by eminent domain except for public use.
Hirsh v. Block, 267 F. 614, 11 A.L.R. 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1920);
United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welsh, 327 U.S.
546, 90 L. Ed. 843 (1946). In most jurisdictions today the ac-
quiring of property in slum blighted areas for the purpose of erecting
low cost houses on such land for rental to people of low income is
for a public use. Zurn v. Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 59 N.E. 2d 18
(1945) ; Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, 357
Pa. 329, 54 A. 2d 277 (1947); McNulty v. Owens, 188 S.C. 377,
199 S.E. 425 (1938). The taking of an unmarketable vacant area
in which there was scattered ownership, undesirable platting, or
tax delinquencies has been held to be a public use, People ex rel.
Gutknecht v. Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 111 N.E. 2d 626 (1953); as
well as the acquisition and development of an area which includes
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vacant and unimproved land and structures not in themselves sub-
standard. Ghold Realty Co. v. Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.
2d 365 (1954). The fact that every inhabitant of the community
does not benefit does not prevent the use from being classified as a
public use, Bookhart v. Central Electric Powe'r Cooperative, Inc., 219
S.C. 414, 65 S.E. 2d 781 (1951); nor does the fact that private
individuals will receive incidental benefit keep the use from being
a public use. Hunter v. Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Au-
thority, 195 Va. 326, 78 S.E. 2d 893 (1953). The fact that some
element of private gain is present does not eliminate the public
character of the taking. Belovsky v. Redcvelopment Authority of
Philadelphia, supra. However, a statute authorizing the exercise of
eminent domain is said to be void where private and public uses are
so interwoven that they cannot be separated. Shizas v. Detroit, 333
Mich. 44, 52 N.W. 2d 589 (1952) ; Miller v. Town of Pulaski, 109
Va. 137, 63 S.E. 880 (1909). In some courts, under a constitution-
al amendment granting to the legislature power to determine what
is public use, a redevelopment law granting the power of eminent
domain to accomplish a project from which a private corporation
ultimately reaps a profit is not unconstitutional. Hertzinger v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 203 Md. 49, 98 A. 2d 87 (1953) ; Murray v. LaGuardia,
291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E. 2d 884 (1943). A legislative finding that
a taking of property is for a public use is not conclusive, but is
entitled to great respect. New York City Housing Authority v. Mul-
ler, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E. 2d 153 (1936). Hence, the question ulti-
mately is subject to judicial review. Adams v. Housing Authority
of Daytona Beach, Fla., 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952); Cleveland v.
City of Detroit, 322 Mich. 172, 33 N.W. 2d 747 (1948).
Public purpose and public use are not synonymous. Bookhart v.
Central Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., supra. Nevertheless, in
the majority of the courts today redevelopment projects with sale
or lease of land to private agencies have been held to be for a valid
public purpose for which the power of eminent domain may be used.
Velishka v. City of Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 106 A. 2d 571 (1954);
Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, supra. Con-
trarily, Riley v. Charleston Union Station Co., 71 S.C. 454, 51 S.E.
485 (1904) and Bookhart v. Central Electric Power Cooperative,
Inc., supra, hold to the effect that private property cannot be taken
except for public use; as do Housing Authority of Atlanta v. John-
son, 87 Ga. App. 560, 74 S.E. 2d 891 (1953) and Adams v. Hous-
ing Authority of Daytona Beach, Fla., supra, which held that re-
development projects with ultimate sale or lease of land to private
[Vol. 8
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agencies were unconstitutional because the takings were not for
public use.
In a decision representing the minority view the instant case
holds in accord with two other southern states to the effect that
private property cannot be taken from a private individual unless
it be taken for a public use. In deciding that public use must entail
some direct use by the public, the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina repudiated the public purpose theory which sanctioned taking
of private property through eminent domain so long as the public
received some benefit. By carrying the public purpose doctrine to a
logical extreme it would be possible to take all private property just
so long as it can be shown that the public will benefit. A zealous
housing authority could condemn an area of conventional homes as
a blighted area by declaring that the houses were not in conformity
with the rest of an ultra-modern city. It would matter little that
the conventional homeowners did not care to be modern. This case
holds in accord with the theory that a man may own property and
be entitled to a reasonable use thereof. And to argue that under
the proposed redevelopment plan the property would ultimately re-
turn to private individuals is repugnant to those individuals who be-
lieve that property rights are sacred and should be protected.
PATRICK, H. G-AYsoN.
CRIMINAL LAW- Consent to Sexual Intercourse as a Defense
to an Indictment for Assault with Intent to Rape.- The three
defendants were indicted for rape, assault with intent to rape, and
assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. The prose-
cutrix alleged that they forced her into their automobile, took inde-
cent liberties with her person against her will, drove to a secluded
spot, and each in turn forcibly had intercourse with her. The de-
fendants admitted picking up the prosecutrix and subsequently hav-
ing intercourse with her, but they averred that there was absolutely
no force involved and that it was all done with her acquiescence and
consent. At the trial the defendants were acquitted of the first two
counts, but convicted of assault and battery of a high and aggravated
nature. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. A conviction of assault
and battery of a high and aggravated nature can be sustained as a
matter of law even though the defendants have been acquitted of
rape. An acquittal of the charge of rape when intercourse was ad-
mitted, is necessarily a finding of consent to the intercourse, but the
1956]
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jury may find that there was no such consent to prior indecent acts
of the defendants. DICTA: A conviction of assault with intent
to rape can also be sustained as a matter of law where the defendants
are acquitted of rape. State v. Collins, --.. S.C ..... , 91 S.E. 2d 259
(1956).
While the verdict might seem to be inconsistent, a jury is not
required to be consistent and mere inconsistency will not invalidate
the verdict. State v. Davis, 214 N.C. 787, 1 S.E. 2d 104 (1939);
State v. Duck, 201 S.C. 94, 41 S.E. 2d 628 (1947). When an in-
dictment includes an offense of an inferior degree, the jury may
discharge the accused of the higher crime and convict him of the
lesser. Watson v. State of Georgia, 116 Ga. 607, 43 S.E. 32 (1902) ;
People v. Santoro, 229 N.Y. 277, 128 N.E. 237 (1920). This is
true even though the same evidence is presented in proving the
various crimes. State v. Rector, 166 S.C. 335, 164 S.E. 865 (1931) ;
State v. Williams, 202 S.C. 408, 25 S.E. 2d 288 (1943). In a rape
prosecution, where the penetration has been admitted or established,
it is possible that the facts will justify a conviction of rape and
nothing else. People v. Swist, 136 Cal. 520, 69 Pac. 223 (1902);
Parrett v. State, 20 Ind. 7, 159 N.E. 755 (1928). In such instances,
it is not error for the trial judge to refrain from charging the jury
on the offenses of assault with intent to rape and assault and battery.
Andrews v. State, 196 Ga. 84, 26 S.E. 263 (1943); State v. Gatlin,
208 S.C. 414, 38 S.E. 2d 238 (1946). However, under an indict-
ment charging rape, the accused may be convicted of assault and
battery and found not guilty of rape. Sills v. State, 36 Ga. 103, 135
S.E. 758 (1926); State v. Allison, 126 N.J.L. 76, 18 A. 2d 713
(1941). The jury can also convict the defendant of assault with
intent to rape under a rape indictment if they find that the prose-
cutrix resisted for a time but ultimately yielded. State v. Hartigan,
32 Vt. 607, 78 Am. Dec. 609 (1860); Paxton v. State, 108 Ark.
316, 157 S.W. 396 (1913). Her resistance might not have been
so continued and persistent as to render the defendant guilty of rape
when he succeeds in having carnal knowledge. State v. Cross, 12
Iowa 66, 79 Am. Dec. 519 (1861); Taylor v. State, 180 Wis. 577,
193 N.W. 353 (1923). The subsequent yielding and consent does
not mitigate the crime, Parkinson v. State, 205 Ark. 975, 172 S.W.
2d 18 (1943); Paxton v. State, supra, nor does it have a retroac-
tive effect so as to justify the assault with intent to rape. State v.
Hartigan, supra. However, only in cases where the evidence re-
quires or permits, can a conviction for assault with intent to rape
be sustained under an indictment charging rape. People v. Lewis,
[Vol. 8
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252 Ill. 281, 96 N.E. 1005 (1911). The facts may show that the
prosecutrix actually consented to the entire transaction, and there-
fore there was no offense at all. People v. Keith, 141 Cal. 686, 75
Pac. 304 (1904) ; Parrett v. State, szpra.
In the instant case, the South Carolina Supreme Court did not
pass directly on the question of whether an acquittal on a rape
charge would bar an indictment for assault with intent to rape.
Since the jury found the defendants not guilty on this charge, it
was not an issue on appeal. Nevertheless, the principal discussion
in the opinion was concerned with this problem. The court did
hold that the defendant could be convicted of assault and battery
of a high and aggravated nature even though acquitted of rape. This
offense is just one rung further down the ladder of lesser included
offenses. More important, the court in reaching its conclusion re-
lied on cases from other jurisdictions which held that consent to
intercourse is not a bar to an indictment for assault with intent to
rape. The South Carolina Court did not cite a single case dealing
with assault and battery, but relied wholly on cases concerned with
the point under discussion. This seems to indicate that if the ques-
tion were to come before the court, they would follow the majority
of American jurisdictions in holding that an acquittal of rape is not
necessarily a defense to an indictment for assault with intent to rape
HARVEY M. SPAR.
J
CBIMJNAL LAW -Power of the Appellate Court to Modifr a
Sentence. -The defendants were convicted on the charge of high-
way robbery and sentenced to serve 10 years imprisonment. An
accomplice, having waived presentment of a true bill by the grand
jury, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to serve 18 months. On
appeal, the defendants raised the question of whether their sentence
was not out of reason in view of the confessor getting only an 18
months sentence where he had a record that warranted a maximum
sentence. HELD: Affirmed. The Supreme Court has no juris-
diction on appeal to correct a sentence alleged to be excessive when
it is within the limits prescribed by law in the discretion of the trial
judge and is not the result of partiality, prejudice, oppression or a
corrupt motive. State v. Fleming, 228 S.C. 129, 89 S.E. 2d 104
(1955).
Generally, in the absence of statutory authority, the appellate
court has no discretionary jurisdiction to modify a judgment within
1956]
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the limits allowed by the applicable statutes. U. S. v. Kapsalis, 214
F. 2d 685 (7th Cir. 1954) ; U. S. v. Rosenberg, 195 F. 2d 583 (2d
'Cir. 1952) ; State v. Horton, 132 Conn. 276, 43 A. 2d 744 (1945) ;
Lowery v. State, 202 Md. 314, 96 A. 2d 20 (1953). "The Legisla-
ture is the judge of the adequacy of the penalties necessary to pre-
vent crime and unless it clearly and manifestly appears that the
punishment fixed by that body is cruel and unconstitutional the court
will not interfere." Golden v. Commonwealth, 275 Ky. 208, 121
S.W. 2d 21 (1938). The imposition of a sentence in a criminal case
is a matter peculiarly within the province of the trial judge, Reid
v. State, 200 Md. 89, 88 A. 2d 478 (1952) ; State v. Johnson, 119
S.C. 55, 110 S.E. 460 (1919) or, in other jurisdictions, within the
province of the jury. Scott v. State, 247 Ala. 62, 22 So. 2d 529
(1945) ; Golden v. Comnononwealth, supra. The appellate court has
no means by which to ascertain all the elements that enter into the
fixing of the length of a sentence, whereas the trial judge is in a
much better position to award the proper punishment. State v. Mele,
125 Conn. 210, 4 A. 2d 336 (1939) ; State v. Sheppard, 54 S.C. 178,
32 S. E. 146 (1899). A sentence within the limits fixed by a statute
will not be regarded as cruel or unusual if the statute fixing the
punishment is not unconstitutional. Reid v. State, supra; State v.
Scates, 212 S.C. 150, 46 S.E. 2d 693 (1948). Therefore, a sentence
will not be modified on appeal if it is within the statutory limits
-and from the facts it is not manifestly shown that the trial court
h1as abused its discretion. State v. Horton, supra; Golden v. Com-
inonwcalth, supra; State v. Sheppard, supra. This restriction of the
power of an appellate court has been removed in a number of juris-
dictions with the grant of statutory authority. People v. Cossey,
97 Cal. App. 2d 101, 217 P. 2d 133 (1950) ; State v. Robinson, 161
,Ohio St. 213, 118 N.E. 2d 517 (1954); Commonwealth v. Oxman,
173 Pa. Super. 482, 98 A. 2d 424 (1953). Thus, when it is neces-
"sary in the furtherance of justice, it is the duty of the appellate
-court to review the evidence and to reduce or modify the degree
,of the offense or the punishment imposed when the evidence does
-not warrant the sentence rendered in the lower court, Sundahl v.
State, 154 Neb. 550, 48 N.W. 2d 689 (1951); Easterling v. State,
_... Okla. Cr. App ..... , 248 P. 2d 741 (1955), although the question
as to excessive sentence was not raised on appeal by the defendant,
State v. Constanzo, 76 Idaho 19, 276 P. 2d 959 (1954). Correction
may be made by the appellate court and the modified sentence im-
posed by that court, People v. Blumenthal, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 735
(1954); Forsha v. State, 183 Tenn. 604, 194 S.W. 2d 463 (1946),
[Vol. 8
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or remanded to the lower court for resentencing. Bornstein v.
State, 54 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1951) ; Jenkins v. State, 207 Miss. 281,
42 So. 2d 198 (1949). However, this power is not used indis-
criminately, and where the evidence is sufficient to support the sen-
tence, usually no modification of the trial court's sentence is made.
Kawakita v. U. S., 343 U.S. 717, 96 L. Ed. 1249 (1952); Jordan
v. State, 96 Okla. Cr. App. 343, 255 P. 2d 295 (1953). In South
Carolina there appears to be one exception to the otherwise firmly
entrenched rule. The cases which fall into the exception are those
cases wherein the defendant was convicted under a statute that fixes
no maximum penalty for the offense but leaves it to the discretion
of the trial judge to determine the punishment since it is necessarily
influenced by numerous factors. As was stated in Singletary v.
Wilson, Superintendent, 191 S.C. 153, 3 S.E. 2d 802 (1939), "It
necessarily follows that the discretion of the trial court in its determi-
nation of the amount of the penalty . . . must be subject to be re-
viewed on appeal to this Court, if clearly abused, under Article I,
Section 19 of the Constitution, which not only forbids the inflic-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment, but forbids the imposition
of excessive fines." However, the sentence must be manifestly ex-
cessive from the facts ". . . to evoke the rare jurisdiction of this
court to interfere with the exercise of the discretion of the trial
Judge in the imposition of sentence upon a defendant . . . " State
v. Goodall, 221 S.C. 175, 69 S.E. 2d 915 (1952), since the trial
judge is in a much better position than the appellate court to fix
the penalty to be imposed. State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46
S.E. 2d 273 (1948). In the instances in which the South Carolina
Supreme Court has determined that a sentence is excessive for the
crime charged, the usual procedure is to affirm the conviction, set
aside the sentence and remand the case to the lower court for re-
sentencing. State v. Kimbrough, supra; State v. Gregory, 198 S.C.
98, 16 S.E. 2d 532 (1941).
Throughout the entire process from arrest to conviction, great
efforts are expended to insure that justice is rendered to the ac-
cused. The appellate court has the power to review any and every
step of the process to assure that the rights of the accused have
been kept inviolate. Ought not the sentence imposed be subject to
this same scrutinizing review? As was said in Lowery v. State,
supra, "It is well to remember that judges, though trained and disci-
plined, are not impervious to influences which affect other men."
Experience has shown that trial judges do err in actions in both
1956]
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law cases of a civil nature and equity cases. Through what fantasy
is it to be presumed that he who is capable of error in other phases
of his discretion is now omniscient for this one act?
ARTHUR M. FLOWERS, JR.
DOMESTIC BELATIONS - FEES AND ALLOWANCES - Al-
lowance of Counsel Fees Upon Reconciliation of Parties During
Suit. - Plaintiff wife retained an attorney to bring an action for
separate maintenance against defendant spouse, whereupon defen-
dant filed a counterclaim for divorce. At the preliminary hearing,
plaintiff's counsel was awarded a fee pendente lite in the sum of
$500 plus taxed costs. The action continued on the docket during
which time the parties became reconciled and plaintiff's attorney
moved to dismiss the action and counterclaim and applied for a
counsel fee. Chancery Division of the Superior Court allowed a
fee of $2,000. Defendant counsel's petition for a rehearing on
the grounds that the decree was issued after the judge's statutory re-
tirement because of age was granted. ON REHEARING: No
award of a fee could be made because the cause of action had abated
with the reconciliation and only an order of dismissal could be issued
in the case. Cole v. Cole, 30 N.J. Super. 433, 104 A. 2d 866 (1954).
Alimony and counsel fees may be awarded, not as a matter of
course, but rather in the sound discretion of the court after considera-
tion of the pleadings and customary affidavits. Shaffer v. Shaffer,
129 N.J. Eq. 42, 17 A. 2d 780 (1941) ; Mugin v. Mugin, 166 S.C.
43, 164 S.E. 238 (1932). Most states, including South Carolina,
have statutes to this effect. Code of Laws of South Carolina 1952
§§ 20-113 and 20-113.1. It is the duty of the court though to bring
about a reconciliation of the parties where possible. Code of Laws
of South Carolina 1952 §§ 20-110 and 20-110.1. A majority of
jurisdictions hold that once the parties to the suit have become
reconciled, or a dismissal of the action has been requested or ob-
tained due to the reconciliation, the court has no power to entertain
any further proceedings in the suit. Keefer v. Keefer, 140 Ga. 18,
78 S.E. 462, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 527 (1913); Anderson v. Stegar,
173 Ill. 112, 50 N.E. 665 (1898). These courts base their holdings
principally on two points. Primarily, the necessary reopening of
the suit is a violation of public policy as it may tend to break up
the reconciliation and cause a resumption of the litigation. Bell v.
Bell, 214 Ala. 537, 108 So. 375, 45 A.L.R. 935 (1926); Hardy v.
[Vol. 8
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Hardy, 67 Ill. App. 533, 92 N.E. 2d 221 (1950); State ex rel. Cash
v. Rose, Judge, 63 Ohio App. 244, 26 N.E. 2d 225 (1939). Second-
ly, the courts assert that they are without jurisdiction to hear any such
motion because the cause of action is abated. Neither party can
take any action adverse to the other and the motion would necessarily
have to be maintained in the wife's name. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 67
Cal. 176, 7 Pac. 480 (1885) ; Mayer v. Mayer, 30 Ill. App. 683, 51
N.E. 2d 805 (1943) ; Kuntz v. Kuntz, 80 N.J. Eq. 429, 83 Ati. 787
(1912). It has been held, however, that where the attorney already
has a valid order or judgment for payment of part of his fees,
the amount fixed is presumed to be earned and is unaffected by a
subsequent reconciliation of the parties and a dismissal of the action.
Shinn v. Morris, Dist. Judge of the 7th Judicial Dist., 205 Okla.
289, 237 P. 2d 455 (1951); Sherry v. Rowe, 181 Okla. 119, 73 P.
2d 134 (1937). In Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 114 Minn. 511, 131 N.W.
481 (1911) it was held a mere reconciliation and nothing more did
not deprive counsel of action for his fees as this was not the legal
equivalent of a dismissal and the action was still pending. Georgia,
on the other hand, has held that a resumption of marital relation-
ships during the pendency of the suit amounts to a termination of the
divorce proceedings and will render void a judgment for temporary
alimony and attorney's fees. Hamby v. Pye, 195 Ga. 366, 24 S.E. 2d
201 (1943) ; Thomas v. Smith, 185 Ga. 243, 194 S.E. 502 (1937).
This position perhaps is due to a statute which reads: "The subse-
quent voluntary cohabitation of the husband and wife shall annul and
set aside all provisions made, either by deed or decree, for permanent
alimony." Code of Laws of Georgia 1933 § 30-217. The minority view
is that upon the clearest principles of common honesty as well as law,
an attorney should be compensated for services rendered and the wife
allowed suit money for the purpose. Taylor v. Taylor, 33 Idaho 445,
196 Pac. 211 (1921); Fullhart v. Fullhart, 109 Mo. App. 705, 83
S.W. 541 (1904); Kiddle v. Kiddle, 90 Neb. 248, 133 N.W. 181,
36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1001, Ann. Cas. 1913A 796 (1911). In actions
for separate maintenance, some courts have allowed the attorney to
maintain in his own name an action against the husband on the
theory that the wife's counsel fees are necessaries. Maddy v. Prevul-
sky, 178 Iowa 1091, 160 N.W. 762, L.R.A. 1917C 335 (1917);
Gosserand v. Monteleone, 159 La. 316, 105 So. 356, 42 A.L.R. 310
(1925). In any case the attorney may proceed to sue the wife for
the services he rendered to her. Collins v. Welsh, 2 Cal. App. 2d
103, 37 P. 2d 505 (1934); Murphy v. Murphy, 56 S.D. 355, 228
19561
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N.W. 464 (1930); Humpries v. Cooper, 55 Wash. 376, 104 Pac.
606 (1909).
In matrimonial cases, the wife is regarded as the favored suitor
and the husband is called upon to pay her counsel's fees; otherwise,
in many cases an indigent wife would be powerless to assert her le-
gal rights. Wives, therefore, are enabled to obtain reputable counsel
who have the implied assurance that their fees will be paid. Counsel
in such cases are strongly urged both by the court and by public
policy to affect reconciliations where possible. Yet are attorneys
to be penalized by a denial of their fees when they have carried out
this duty laid upon them? A mere platitude seems to exist. Public
policy condones the giving of reasonable counsel fees; yet puts upon
counsel the duty of bringing about a reconciliation and then denies
them their compensation. It is true the cause of action no longer
exists between the husband and wife and the only order the court
can make is to dismiss the action, but it would seem that the wife's
solicitor has acquired a separate interest of his own which the courts
should protect.
J AN A. GALLOWAY.
EVIDENCE - Effect of Oath on Admissibility of Confessions. -
Defendant, an eighteen year old" Negro, after questioning by state
and county law enforcement officers, confessed to the murder of
an eighty-four year old Negro man. The confession was made
voluntarily, and not under threat or duress, or in consequence of
any inducements. The confession was reduced to writing, subscribed
and sworn to by defendant before a notary public. Upon the trial
court's refusal to exclude the written confession from evidence, de-
fendant appealed to the Supreme Court. HELD: Affirmed. When
an extrajudicial confession is otherwise admissible, the mere fact
that such confession was made under oath does not render it in-
admissible as evidence. State v. Sanders, 227 S.C. 287, 87 S.E. 2d
826 (1955).
The broad general rule was laid down in the earlier English cases
that any confession made under oath was inadmissible as evidence.
Regina v. Wheeley, 8 Car. & P. 250, 173 Eng. Rep. 482 (N.P.
1838) ; Rex v. Wilson, Holt, N.P. 597, 171 Eng. Rep. 353 (1817) ;
Bull. N.P. 242 (1767). A small number of American courts fol-
lowed this rule applying it to extrajudicial as well as judicial con-
fessions which had been made under oath. United States v. Basca-
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dore, 24 Fed. Cas. 1028, No. 14, 536 (C.C. D.C. 1811); United
States v. Duffy, 25 Fed. Cas. 922, No. 14, 998 (C.C. D.C. 1804) ;
People v. Gibbons, 43 Cal. 557 (1872) ; Jackson v. State, 56 Miss. 311
(1879). Such confessions were generally excluded on the grounds
that the administration of the oath rendered the confession involun-
tary and compulsory. Steele v. State, 76 Miss. 387, 24 So. 910
(1899) ; State v. Glass, 50 Wis. 218, 6 N.W. 500, 36 Am. Rep. 845
(1880). However, it is now generally recognized that an extra-
judicial confession which is otherwise admissible is not rendered
inadmissible by virtue of the fact that it was made under oath or
that it was taken down in writing and sworn to. United States v.
Brown, 40 Fed. 457 (D.C. S.C. 1889); United States v. Graff, 26
Fed. Cas. 1, No. 15, 244 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1878); Riley v. State,
180 Ga. 869, 181 S.E. 154 (1935); Commonwealth v. Wesley, 166
Mass. 248, 44 N.E. 228 (1896); People v. Kennedy, 159 N.Y. 346,
54 N.E. 51, 70 Am. St. Rep. 557 (1899). A defendant in a criminal
case can not be made to take the stand, be put under oath, and com-
pelled to testify against himself. S. C. CoiTsT. Art. I, § 17; South
Carolina Code of Laws 1952 § 26-408. But a confession, merely be-
cause it was made under oath, does not become a deposition in a judi-
cial proceeding, and hence, any constitutional provision that the de-
fendant in a criminal case shall not be compelled to be a witness
against himself can have no application. Peoplc v. Owen, 154 Mich.
571, 118 N.W. 590, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 520 (1908). Contra to the
common law, it now appears to be the prevailing rule that a confession
made under oath before a committing magistrate or a coroner is
not to be excluded simply because such confession was sworn to.
Sheppard v. State, 68 Ga. 127, 22 S.E. 2d 347 (1942); Teachout
v. People, 41 N.Y. 7 (1869) ; Commonwealth v. Clark, 130 Pa. 641,
18 Atl. 988 (1890); Pierce v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 302, 234 S.W.
537 (1921). The enactment of statutes allowing persons accused
of a crime to testify in their own behalf has removed the element of
compulsion and renders a confession made under oath admissible.
People v. Kelly, 47 Cal. 125 (1873); Steele v. State, supra; State
v. Glass, supra. However, such a confession is still subject to the
rules requiring that any confession, to be admissible as evidence on
trial of the accused, must have been voluntarily given without any
compulsion or in consequence of any inducement. Hendrickson v.
State, 229 P. 2d 196 (Okla. 1951) ; Elliott v. State, 185 Miss. 402, 189
So. 796 (1939); People v. Chapleau, 121 N.Y. 266, 24 N.E. 469
(1890); Enoch v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 411, 126 S.E. 222
(1925). The confession should be preceded by proper warning that
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it may be used in evidence against the confessor and that he is not
obliged to incriminate himself. Tuttle v'. People, 33 Colo. 243, 79
Pac. 1035, 3 Ann. Cas. 513, 70 L.R.A. 33 (1905) ; McNish v. State,
45 Fla. 83, 34 So. 219, 110 Am. St. Rep. 65 (1903) ; Adams v. State,
129 Ga. 248, 58 S.E. 822, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 468, 12 Ann. Cas. 158
(1907); State v. Nee'dham, 78 N.C. 474 (1878). It is not neces-
sary that the person confessing shall have been accused of the crime
at the time he made the confession. Hendrickson v. People, 10 N.Y.
13, 61 Am. Dec. 721 (1854); State v. Glass, supra. But, when a
party under charge of committing a particular crime is called by
the prosecution and compelled to answer, under oath, as to such
crime, on the trial of another party, his testimony is regarded as
given under compulsion, and cannot afterwards be introduced against
him when he is on trial. The same privilege is applied to any case
in which he is forced to answer, under oath, questions relating to
the crime with which he is charged, and his confession resulting
from such testimony is sought to be used against him. State v.
Meyer, 181 Iowa 440, 164 N.W. 794 (1917); Jackson v. State,
supra; People v. McMahon, 15 N.Y. 384 (1857). The confession
of the commission of a criminal offense, when freely and voluntari-
ly made under oath by a witness before a grand jury, may subse-
quently be used against the witness as substantive evidence upon
the trial for the crime confessed. United States v. Charles, 25 Fed.
Cas. 409, No. 14, 786 (C.C. D.C. 1813) ; State v. Coffee, 56 Conn.
399, 16 Atl. 151 (1888) ; Padgett v. State, 176 Ga. 314, 168 S.E. 53
(1933); State v. Campbell, 73 Kan. 688, 85 Pac. 784, 9 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 533 (1906); People v. Richte'r, 182 Miss. 96, 43 N.Y.S. 2d
114 (1943). And it does not affect the admissibility of the sworn
confession that the witness at the time was under arrest or sub-
poena. Jenkins v. State, 35 Fla. 737, 18 So. 182, 48 Am. St. Rep.
267 (1895) ; State v. Campbell, supra; Medlock v. State, 108 Tex.
Crim. 274, 1 S.W. 2d 308 (1927). But cf. State v. Smith, 56 S.D.
238, 228 N.W. 240 (1929). The earlier South Carolina cases ad-
mitted as evidence the testimony of a witness at a coroner's inquest
or before a committing magistrate on the ground that a witness
could claim the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to
answer any incriminating questions. This was held to be the rule
whether the witness was the accused, a suspect, or an ordinary wit-
ness. State v. Branham, 13 S.C. 389 (1879); State v. Vaigneur,
5 Rich. L. 391 (S.C. 1852). However, in later cases the court ig-
nored these cases and held that when a person is summoned before
a coroner's inquest or a magistrate's proceeding and compelled to
[Vol. 8
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testify, such testimony is inadmissible as evidence in a subsequent
trial of the witness for the crime. This rule applied whether or not
the witness was the accused, a suspect, or an ordinary witness. The
holding was based on the theory that such a confession could not
be regarded as free and voluntary, and further, that even though
such a witness could refuse to answer questions on claiming the
privilege against self-incrimination, his exercise of the privilege at
once created a suspicion of his guilt. Still another reason was that
the witness might not know of his right to refuse to answer in-
criminating questions. State v. Perry, 106 S.C. 289, 91 S.E. 300
(1917) ; State v. Tapp, 105 S.C. 55, 89 S.E. 394 (1916) ; State v.
Senn, 32 S.C. 392, 11 S.R. 292 (1890). But other South Carolina
decisions seem to have limited these cases. When the accused had
been warned that he could refuse to answer incriminating questions
and that anything he said might later be used against him, or when
the accused voluntarily took the stand and waived his privilege
against self-incrimination, testimony made by the witness at prior
judicial proceedings has been admitted as evidence on the subsequent
trial of the witness. State v. Simmons, 112 S.C. 451, 100 S.E. 149
(1919) ; State v. Barwick, 89 S.C. 153, 71 S.E. 838 (1911); State
v. Baker, 58 S.C. 111, 36 S.E. 501 (1900). Although there appears
to be a conflict of authority on this subject in South Carolina, it
seems clear that whenever such testimony has been excluded from
evidence, it was excluded on some ground other than the mere fact
that an oath had been administered to the witness. Hence, the hold-
ing in the principal case should apply to judicial confessions meeting
the above requirements, as well as to extrajudicial confessions made
by the defendant.
Most of the cases which hold that a confession made under oath
was inadmissible as evidence arose prior to the enactment of statutes
making defendants competent witnesses in their own behalf. With
the removal of the disqualification of the accused as a witness for
himself, the reason for the rule ceased. The oath can no longer be
regarded as a form of legal compulsion which, with the fear of the
consequences of perjury before the witnesses' eyes, renders a confes-
sion under oath, or testimony given under oath, involuntary. Fur-
ther, there is no sound reason upon which such a rule can be based.
Statements made by the accused out of court concerning the crime
charged, if freely and voluntarily made, may always be proved
against him on his trial. There would seem to be no logical reason
for excluding such a confession simply because the confessor made
it under oath. Again, why should statements made in court under
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oath, and which are equally free and voluntary, stand upon a dif-
ferent footing? His voluntary testimony under oath, given in a
proceeding in which he is authorized to testify, ought to stand upon
at least as favorable a footing. Applying the test of reliability, there
could scarcely be said to be anything in the nature of an oath cal-
culated to make the defendant speak falsely against himself. There
would appear to be no infringement of any constitutional provision
against self-incrimination in the mere administration of an oath, so
long as the accused is not compelled to testify. Hence, it would
seem that the court in the instant case has reached the only logical
and just decision possible on this novel question of law in holding
that the test of the extrajudicial confession was not whether it was
sworn to, but whether the statement was free and voluntary. For the
reasons pointed out above it is desirable that the court apply the
same rule to judicial confessions whenever the occasion arises.
CARY C. DOYLe.
EVIDENCE - TRIAL - Unfavorable Inference from Failure to
Call a Witness. - Beneficiary brought an action to recover under
the provisions of an accidental death insurance policy issued by the
defendant insurer. Upon being notified of the death of the insured,
the insurer informed the beneficiary that the policy had lapsed for
nonpayment of the premium. Undisputed testimony of the bene-
ficiary was that the time for payment of the premium had been ex-
tended by the insurer's manager and field agent. Upon the trial
court's direction of verdict for the insured and refusal to grant a
new trial defendant insurer appealed to the Supreme Court. HELD:
Affirmed. Insurer's field agent was present but was not placed upon
the stand to deny the testimony of the beneficiary thereby raising
the inference that had such testimony been presented it would 'have
been unfavorable to the insurer. Matthews v. National Fidelity In-
surance Company, .... S.C ...... 89 S.E. 2d 95 (1955).
The right is given to any party litigant to introduce witnesses of
his own choosing, yet an unfavorable inference may arise against
him for failure to produce a particular witness. Killings v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, 187 Miss. 265, 192 So. 577, 131
A.L.R. 684 (1940); 2 Wigmore, Evidence S 285 (3d ed. 1940).
Such an inference arises from the unexplained failure of a party to
produce the testimony of an available witness who has superior
knowledge of the facts on a material issue in the cause and who would
[Vol. 8
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apparently favor that party. Fulson-Morris Coal & Mining Com-
pany v. Mitchell, 37 Okla. 575, 132 Pac. 1103 (1913); 20 Am. Jur.,
Evidence S 187 (1939). Ever since the case of the chimney sweep-
er's jewel, this has been a recognized rule; in an action of trover,
the jury was instructed that unless the defendant did produce the
jewel and show it not to be of the finest water, they should pre-
sume the strongest against him and make the value of the best
jewels the measure of their damages which they accordingly did.
Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Str. (K.B.) 505, 93 E.R. 664 (1722). Earli-
er records of this mode of reasoning are found in Ward v. Apprice,
6 Mod. (K.B.) 264, 87 E.R. 1011 (1705). This rule was early
recognized in most of the states and in South Carolina in both civil
and criminal cases. Clifton v. United States. 4 How. 242. 11 L.
Ed. 957 (1846); Murray v. The South Carolina Railroad Com-
pany, 10 Rich. 227 (S.C. 1857). This rule does not apply when
plaintiff's evidence does not establish a prima facie case, since the
inference does not rise to the level of a formal presumption. Mo-
ineier v. Koebig, 220 S.C. 124, 66 S.E. 2d 465 (1951); 31 C.J.S.,
Evidence S 156 (1942). The failure to call as a witness an em-
ployee who has knowledge of a material issue raises an inference
that the testimony would be adverse. Robinson v. Duke Power
Company, 213 S.C. 185, 48 S.E. 2d 808 (1948); Mickle v. Dixie
Security Life Insurance Company, 216 S.C. 168, 57 S.E. 2d 73
(1949). There is authority that there should be no inference in such
a case since the witness is subject to call by the opposing party.
Longacre v. Yonkers Railroad Company, 236 N.Y. 119, 140 N.E.
215, 28 A.L.R. 1030 (1923). There seems to be no disposition to
accept such a limitation absolutely or to enforce it strictly. 31 C.J.S.,
Evidence S 156 (1942) ; 2 Wigmore, Evidence S 288 (3d ed. 1940).
Normally when a lawyer calls a witness he feels he is "vouching
for his honesty and his testimony". Frost, Presenting the Evidence,
8 S.C.L:Q. 198 (1955). Furthermore the rules of evidence greatly
circumscribe counsel in cross-examination of his own witness, and
subject to narrow exceptions, forbid him to impeach. Finch v.
Weiner, 145 Atl. 31 (Conn. 1929); State v. Nelson, 192 S.C. 422,
7 S.E. 2d 72 (1940). Some cases hold that when the person is no
longer in the employ of the party, there is no inference that his
testimony would be unfavorable. Ellermnan v. Skelly Oil Company,
227 Minn. 65, 34 N.W. 2d 251, 5 A.L.R. 2d 886 (1948). No un-
favorable inference can arise from failure to call a witness who
although possessing peculiar knowledge of facts is adverse to a party
or privileged. State v. Vickers, 226 S.C. 301, 84 S.E. 2d 873 (1954) ;
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Dallar v. Johnston, 87 Ga. App. 261, 73 S.E. 2d 336 (1952) ; 31
C.J.S., Evidence S 156 (1942). A variance of opinion exists as to
when and how to raise the question of failure to produce the testi-
mony of a particular witness. Killings v. Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Company, supra; 20 Am. Jur., Evidence S 187 (1939). The
propriety of an instruction that the jury may draw reasonable and
natural inferences from the facts proved to their satisfaction has
been recognized. Vandalia Coal Company v. Moore, 69 Ind. App.
311, 121 N.E. 685 (1919); Hornly v. State Life Insurance Com-
pany, 184 N.W. 84 (Neb. 1921). Where the evidence indicates
that there are witnesses seemingly accessible to the accused, or un-
der his control who are or should be cognizant of material and rele-
vant facts and whose testimony would presumably aid his story, if
it were true, the prosecuting attorney may comment upon the ac-
cused's failure to produce them. State v. Cook, 204 S.C. 295, 28
S.E. 2d 842 (1943); State v. Shackelford, 88 S.E. 2d 778 (S.C.
1955). The basis for the rule in the principal case is that under all
of the circumstances when evidence is peculiarly within the defen-
dant's knowledge and reach and no effort is made to procure that
testimony, the inference that it would be unfavorable would rest
in the common knowledge and conviction of all. State v. Grebe, 17
Kan. 458 (1877) ; Carter v. Chambers, 79 Ala. 223 (1885) ; 2 Wig-
more, Evidence S 286 (3d ed. 1940).
An inference that "something is rotten in Denmark" is a natural
and proper reaction from such failure to call an available witness
who possesses knowledge of important facts. Although such an in-
ference supplies no positive evidence, it places a defensive burden
upon the opposing party. Such an inference merely gives greater
credence to the positive evidence of the opposing party on any issue
concerning which it is shown that the witness might have had some
knowledge. Complete advantage from such an inference would be
gained from counsel's argument and from instructions to the jury
as to the burden of proof. Moreover, if the inference commends
itself to reason, born of common judgment and experience, the jury
will apply it without hint or argument from the court.
A dissenting opinion by Mr. justice Frankfurter suggests a broad-
ening of the trial judge's role by making his failure to call material
witnesses in cases involving res ipsa loquitur grounds for a new
trial. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 92 L. Ed. 468 (1947).
In cases where an obvious material witness is missing, the trial judge
should exercise his power to call and examine such witness and
elicit the truth. In such a case, the person called as a witness by
[Vol. 8
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the court is not a witness for either side, and is subject to examina-
tion and cross-examination by both sides. United States v. Young,
26 F. Supp. 574 (W.D. Tex. 1939). The parties then would not
be bound by the application of the archaic rules of evidence which
would govern if the party concerned called the witness.
W, C. PARLM
RECEIVERS - Appointment on Dissolution of Partnership Other
Than by Death. - Plaintiff and his two brothers entered into a
partnership at will, the agreement resting in parol with no provision
for dissolution. Becoming dissatisfied, plaintiff commenced an ac-
tion for dissolution and the appointment of a receiver. Subsequently
defendants formed a corporation and began using partnership effects
in the new business of the same nature. From an order of the trial
judge dissolving the partnership and providing for the management
of its affairs during the period of dissolution by one of the defen-
dants, but denying the appointment of a receiver, plaintiff appealed.
HELD: Modified, and remanded for the appointment of a receiver.
The court erred in the exercise of its discretion, as the effect of the
lower court's order was to constitute the defendant a receiver with-
out bond to liquidate the partnership and to exclude plaintiff from
participation therein. Wrenn v. Wrenn, .... S.C ..... , 91 S.E. 2d 267
(1956).
The court has the power, in the exercise of sound discretion, to
appoint a receiver in proceedings arising out of the dissolution of
a partnership. Kennedy v. Hill, 89 S.C. 462, 71 S.E. 974 (1911);
Vaughan v. Vaughan, 101 W. Va. 561, 133 S.E. 158 (1926). In
the leading English case, the court held that a receiver would not
be appointed merely on the ground of dissolution, but that there
must be a breach of duty to a partner, or the contract of partner-
ship. Harding v. Glover, 18 Ves. Jun. 281, 34 Eng. Reprint 283
(1810). In America, several early decisions were to the effect
that the appointment of a receiver was a matter of course, Allen v.
Hawley, 6 Fla. 142, 63 Am. Dec. 198 (1855); Law v. Ford, 2
Paige 310 (N.Y. 1830); but this rule was not generally accepted.
Tonlinson v. Ward, 2 Conn. 396 (1818); Wilson v. Fitchter, 11
N.J. Eq. 71 (1855). In the exercise of its discretion, the court is
governed by the facts of the case. Bliss v. Griswold, 222 Minn.
494, 25 N.W. 2d 302 (1946) ; Norris v. Lake, 89 Va. 513, 16 S.E.
663 (1893). A case for appointment is readily made out where a
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partner is found to be wasting, misusing, or misappropriating firm
property. Reid v. Freed, 100 Miss. 48, 56 So. 278 (1911); Ellis
v. Commander, 1 Strob. Eq. 188, 192 (S.C. 1846). In Harding v.
Glover, supra, the English court held that the appointment was
proper where the defendant partners had been carrying on trade on
their own account with the partnership effects. In many cases a
receiver is appointed where irreconcilable differences exist between
the partners. Creel v. Creel, 73 F. 2d 107 (App. D.C. 1934) ; Chil-
ders v. Neely, 47 W. Va. 70, 34 S.E. 828 (1899). The dominant
principle, as regards the remedy of receivership in South Carolina,
is stated in Christ Church v. Fishburne, 83 S.C. 304, 307, 65 S.E.
238 (1909), an action for partition among persons not partners:
The authority of the Court to appoint a receiver when a
proper case is made in causes for settlement of estates, or for
partition, or for partnership adjustment, when the property is
owned by different interests, is well settled and a most salutary
one; where the parties who are the owners of the property can-
not agree among themselves as to its disposition pending the
litigation, it is entirely proper for the Court to step in and put
an end to waste or to prevent the threatened loss by appointing
a suitable person to act as receiver to hold the property for the
benefit of all concerned until its final distribution, as may be
directed by the ultimate decision of the Court.
See Karesh, Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act in
South Carolina, 3 S.C.L.Q. 471, 472 (1951).
The appointment of a receiver in the principal case was justified
by the defendants' use of the partnership effects in the corporation
business. Even so, it is apparent that in this case, as in previous
South Carolina cases concerning the appointment of a receiver on
the dissolution of a partnership, the Court proceeded on the assump-
tion that a partner's interest should not, over his protest, be placed
in jeopardy by the use or control of the firm property by the other
partner. Though the trend of the decided cases in the United States
has been toward a reticence on the part of the courts to appoint a
receiver, Annot., 23 A.L.R. 2d 583 (1952); however, South Caro-
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TORT -Liability of Unincorporated Fraternal Organization to
a Member for Injuries Received in Initiation.- Plaintiff was in-
jured during an initiation ceremony when a heavy electric current
was passed through the bench on which he was seated. Action was
brought against the organization and eleven individual members.
Plaintiff recovered against all defendants. Defendants appealed.
HELD: Affirmed as to the organization and reversed as to the
individuals. An unincorporated fraternal association is liable for
the negligence of its agents in carrying on an initiation program.
It is immaterial that plaintiff had already been declared a member
and that the part of the initiation in which he was injured was not
part of the ritual but was "horseplay". Thomas v. Dunne, 179 P.
2d 427 (Colo. 1955).
Unincorporated associations are required to exercise the same care
to avoid injury to others as are corporations and individuals. Pan-
dolfo v. Bank of Benson, 273 Fed. 48 (9th Cir. 1921) ; Feldman v.
N. British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 137 F. 2d 266 (E.D. S.C. 1943).
Although the common law rule, that an unincorporated association
may not sue or be sued in its own name, Brown v. United States,
276 U.S. 134, 72 L. Ed. 500 (1928) ; Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass.
572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906), has been modified or completely changed
in most jurisdictions by statute, Mitchell v. Church of Christ, 221
Ala. 315, 128 So. 781, 70 A.L.R. 71 (1930) ; Bruns v. Milk Wagon
Drivers' Union, Local 603, 242 S.W. 419 (Mo. 1922); Edgar v.
Sou. Ry. Co., 213 S.C. 445, 49 S.E. 2d 841 (1948); these statutes
have not created legal entities of such associations, Medlin v. Ebe-
nezer Methodist Church, 132 S.C. 498, 129 S.E. 830 (1925); nor
have they established the substantive liability of unincorporated as-
sociations to their members. Huth v. Humnboldt Stamr, No. 153, 61
Conn. 227, 23 Atl. 1084 (1891); Koogler v. Koogler, 127 Ohio St.
57, 186 N.E. 725 (1933). As members of an unincorporated asso-
ciation are engaged in a joint enterprise, Devillars v. Hessler, 363
Pa. 498, 70 A. 2d 333, 14 A.L.R. 2d 470 (1950) ; Gilbert v. Crystal
Fountain Lodge, 80 Ga. 248, 4 S.E. 905 (1887), and as a prin-
cipal may not sue his co-principal for the misconduct of a common
agent, M11architto v. Central R. Co. of N. 1., 9 N.J. 456, 88 A. 2d 851
(1952); McClees v. Grand International Brotherhood, 59 Ohio
App. 477, 18 N.E. 2d 812 (1938), most jurisdictions, which have
reported such cases, will not allow a member to maintain an action
against an association for personal injuries resulting from the tor-
tious conduct of another member, or an agent, of the association.
Koogler v. Koogler, supra; Hromek v. Ge'neinde, 238 Wis. 204,
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298 N.W. 587 (1941). Some jurisdictions have allowed persons,
injured while being initiated into unincorporated local lodges or
chapters, to maintain actions against the incorporated national or-
ganizations on the basis of agency relationships between the na-
tional and local associations. Thompson v. Supreme Tent, K.M.,
189 N.Y. 294, 82 N.E. 141 (1907); Mitchell v. Leech, 69 S.C.
413, 48 S.E. 290 (1904). Other jurisdictions have refused to
recognize the agency in similar situations and have denied the in-
jured initiates the right to indemnity from the national organiza-
tion. Jumper v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 62 C.C.A. 361, 127
Fed. 635 (5th Cir. 1904); Kaminski v. Great Camp, K.M.M., 146
Mich. 16, 109 N.W. 33 (1906). South Carolina held the na-
tional order liable when it had authorized the local lodge to initiate,
even though it had not authorized the use of the type of contrivance
which led to the injury. Mitchell v. Leech, supra. Another court
held the national organization not liable where the tortious act was
not a part of the ceremony, but was the independent act of one of
the initiators, although he was the duly constituted agent of the
association. Grand Temple v. Johnson, 135 S.W. 173 (Texas 1911).
Still another court held that the fact that the initiate knew that he
was going to be subjected to some sort of electric shock did not
mean that he was assuming the risk of injury by the negligent ap-
plication of said shock. DeGooyer v. Harkness, 70 S.D. 26, 13 N.W.
2d 815 (1944). The Ontarion Court of Appeals held an unincor-
porated association liable in a situation factually similar to the instant
case. That court reasoned that although the injured party had
sought admission into the organization, he had not consented to the in-
jury. Kinver v. Phoenix Lodge, I.O.O.F., 70 O.R. 377 (C.A. 1885),
cited in Jumper v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., supra.
There is very little authority on the subject of the tort liability
of a fraternal association to a person injured while being initiated
into the organization. Almost all of the cases deal with the liability
of incorporated national organizations for the tortious conduct of
unincorporated subordinate chapters. Consequently, it is difficult to
draw an accurate analogy from these cases which would be applicable
to the circumstances of the instant case. It cannot be determined from
these cases whether the actions were brought against the larger entities
because of : (1) the procedural difficulties in proceeding against unin-
corporated associations; (2) the substantive problems encountered
when one attempts to maintain an action against an organization
of which he is a member; or (3) the simple, practical expediency
of bringing an action against the more prosperous principal in lieu
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of proceeding against the agent. Probably the most serious ob-
stacle to recovery in cases of this nature would be reluctance of the
courts to find substantive liability flowing from an unincorporated
association to its members. At least one court has hurdled this
obstacle by distinguishing between full-fledge members and indi-
viduals in the process of becoming members. A more realistic view
would seem to be the approach of the court in the instant case. To
hold that a member may not seek indemnity from an unincorporated.
association for injuries resulting from the misconduct of persons
acting for the association, when he may have no control over these
individuals, even though he may object to their actions, is to sacri-
fice reason and logic on the altar of judicial precedent. By restrict-
ing recovery to the funds in the organization treasury- funds
which no individual member can claim-it cannot be said that the
plaintiff is suing himself when he sues the association. Whether
jurisdictions such as South Carolina, which do not recognize unin-
corporated associations as legal entities, would accept this view is
a question that must await determination by the courts. The ques-
tions of consent and assumption of risk should not be real problems.
One presenting himself for an initiation ceremony may logically
expect reasonable care to be exercised to protect him from any-
thing more serious than the customary physical discomfort and loss
of dignity inherent in such ceremonies.
WILIAm T. IviY, JR.
TORTS - PARENT AND CHILD - Right of the Child to Re-
cover Damages from One Who Has Negligently Injured Either
Parent. - Plaintiffs, five minor children, brought an action for the
loss of support, maintenance, education, nurture, care, training.
attention, acts of kindness, comfort, and solace occasioned by de-
fendant's negligent act resulting in injury to plaintiff's mother. De-
fendant's motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a cause of
action was denied. HELD: A cause of action is not founded
upon the degree or quantity of the loss but upon the invasion of a
right. Because such rights have not heretofore been recognized,
is not a conclusive reason for denying them. Redress may be had
for a temporary impairment as well as for the total destruction of
a right incident to the family relationship by a wrongdoing third
party. Scruggs v. Meredith, 134 F. Supp. 868 (Hawaii 1955).
It is clear that before a person can assert a cause of action, he
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must have a right of action. Common law has long recognized the
husband's right to maintain an action against a negligent third party
for damages sustained by his wife resulting in the loss of her con-
sortium, Guy v. Liversey, Cro. Jac. 501, 79 Eng. Rep. 428, (K.B.
1629) ; Vernon v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 218 S.C. 402, 63 S.E.
2d 53 (1951) ; Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 196 S.C. 230, 13
S.E. 2d 1, 133 A.L.R. 1144 (1941). But not for the so-called
sentimental elements of consortium. Feneff v. N. Y. Cent. and H.
R. R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436, 24 L.R.A. 1024 (1909). The
cause of action is not for the injury to the wife, but for the invasion
of the legal right. Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy R. R. v. W. 0.
Honey, 63 Fed. Rep. 39, 26 L.R.A. 42 (1894). It grows out of
the marital relations and is incident to the rights thereby acquired,
42 A.L.R. 720; although recent cases hold that the cause of action
does not stand on subrogation but arises directly from the tort,
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F. 2d 811 (App. D.C. 1950). These
rights to the wife's services, aid, comfort, society, and companion-
ship remain despite the so-called Married Woman's Acts. Cook v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R., supra.
A few jurisdictions have recently recognized the wife's right for
loss of consortium due to a negligent injury to the husband. Hit-
affer v. Argonne Co., supra; Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches
Inc., 88 Ga. App. 759, 77 S.E. 2d 24 (1953) ; Cooney v. Moomaw,
109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953). Even though the husband had
recovered under the Workmen's Compensation Act, where the reme-
dies and procedures provided are exclusive, Cummings v. McCoy,
192 S.C. 469, 7 S.E. 2d 222 (1940); Gainey v. Coker's Pedigreed
Seed Co.. .... S.C ..... 87 S.E. 2d 583 (1955) a wife was allowed to
recover in a separate suit at common law for the loss of consortium
with the court declaring that where a third party brings an action
for the breach of an independent duty owing her, the Act will not
deprive her of her action. Hitaffer v. Argonne, supra. A wife has
also been allowed to recover for the loss of means of support against
one furnishing intoxicating liquors to her husband, Pratt v. Daly,
55 Ariz. 535, 104 P. 2d 147, 130 A.L.R. 341 (1940); Neu v. Mc-
Kechnie, 95 N.Y. 632, 47 Am. Rep. 89 (1884). However, the
general rule at common law is that neither the wife nor child has
a cause of action for an injury inflicted upon the husband or father.
Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935);
Liurie v. Mamnvione, 200 Misc. 320, 107 N.Y. 2d 182 (1951); Hin-
nant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925);
Jeune v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 269 P. 2d 723 (Ariz. 1954). The
(Vol. 8
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most common reasons for denying this right are the remoteness of
the wife's injury, Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631,
40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 963 (1912); Feneff v. N. Y. Central and H.
R. R., supra; the fear of double recovery, Bernhardt v. Perry, 276
Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1918) ; the wife is owed no services, Stout
v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019
(1913) ; Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204
(1915) ; the upsetting of settlements, Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420
(Fla. 1952); the inability to measure damages, Marri v. Stamford
Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911) ; Denver Consol. Tramway Co.
v. Riley, 14 Colo. App. 132, 59 Pac. 476 (1899); and the courts
are powerless to create new causes of action. Ripley v. Ewell, supra.
Unlike the common law relationship of husband and wife, there is
no conception of unity of legal identity of parent and child. Dunlap
v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905, 71 A.L.R. 1055 (1930).
Generally, no action will lie against a third person for depriving a
child of his source of support by means of an injury to his parent and
to allow a minor child an action for loss of consortium would open our
courts to a flood of litigation by "everyone whose cheek is tinged
by the blush of shame". Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134,
273 N.Y. Supp. 912 (1934). A very few jurisdictions have al-
lowed a minor child to recover for the alienation of a parent's
affections, Daily v. Parker, 152 F. 2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Johnson
v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E. 2d 810 (1947); Miller v.
Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W. 2d 543 (1949) ; Russiek v. Hicks,
85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949), but more recent cases have
denied the child this right. Lucas v. Bishop, 273 N.W. 2d 397
(Ark. 1954); Elder v. MacAlpine-Downie, 180 F. 2d 385 (App.
D.C. 1950). The reasons advanced are that the courts are power-
less to create new causes of action, Elder v. MacAlpine-Downie, sup-
ra; Scholberg v. Itneyere, 264 Wis. 211, 58 N.W. 2d 698 (1953), and
that the courts fear excessive litigation. Morrow v. Yannantuono,
supra. But, if there is a wrong without remedy, it is the judicial
function to find the remedy, Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56
S.E. 2d 432 (1949) ; it is to decide, not to avoid the question. Daily
v. Parker, supra.
The right of a child to recover for the alienation of affection, an
intentional tort, has been allowed by but a small majority of the
jurisdictions. In the principal case, the children are asking to re-
cover, not for an intentional tort, but for a negligent tort. In Hill
v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 108 F. Supp. 739 (App. D.C. 1952),
the court indicated that its hesitancy to grant relief was because it
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felt that if there was to be any change in the doctrine, the court
should not be the one to initiate it. This, unfortunately, has been
the trend in many cases involving novel questions. Courts which
take this position leave several questions unanswered. First, if the
court feels that the plaintiff in a suit involving a novel question is
entitled to a remedy, but that there currently exists no declared
legal basis for such a remedy based on the invasion of that right,
why should the court deny this plaintiff a recovery? What more
moral right does a subsequent plaintiff in a similar case have for
recovery than does the plaintiff in the original case? Second, in
these days of crowded legislative calendars, who is going to take
the necessary time to draft, introduce, and crusade for such legisla-
tion, and where will the support come from to offset the concen-
trated efforts of the highly organized professional lobbyist? Thus,
for the courts to await legislative action to create a remedy will
often result in great inequities of justice. On the other hand, is
it wise for a few men, sitting as a court, to establish the common
law precedent on such important questions without the benefit of
the extensive investigating committees available to the legislative
branch? Each case must be separately considered. In these days,
the common law should be constantly reappraised to meet changing
conditions. The courts must be willing to decide the question, not
to avoid it. In the principal case, the Hawaiian Court has shown
courage in its decision to establish this new cause of action.
ERAx, R. SHORT.
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